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Abstract 
This article first summarises approaches to military and security education at 
tertiary levels for officers and senior security officials, identifying some institutional 
and conceptual issues, before moving on to a fairly detailed case study of the 
Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM). In its 
institutional form, from 2000 to 2010, SADSEM was a unique experiment in building 
a regional network of universities providing training and education in security 
studies, promoting regional security co-operation and integration and working closely 
with security forces and governments in the Southern African region. Although it 
mostly worked in English, it also carried out education and research in French and 
Portuguese, established an institutional base in ten Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) nations and delivered programmes in all the then 15 of them. 
Its activities included providing training and education for defence and security 
management, civil-military relations, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, policy support 
and the building of scholarly capacity though regional co-operation. Today SADSEM 
activities are restricted mainly to an annual security review conference, but its real 
legacy is in the institutions and capacities it built within several Southern African 
countries, although not all survive. SADSEM kept a low profile because of extreme 
sensitivities in Southern Africa around security issues, and this is the first attempt to 
examine its experience in the context of higher-level security education and training.
A note on methodology 
Much of this article consists of a somewhat phenomonological reflection based 
on the author’s forty years in security studies, security education, policy support 
and capacity building in Africa. Where necessary or possible it is supported by 
documentary references. The SADSEM files are not publicly available but can be 
accessed via the author. 
Introduction 
Around the world militaries increasingly expose their officers to university 
environments and give them the chance to gain higher degrees, as do intelligence 
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agencies and to a much lesser extent police services. Partly this is to make them 
better practitioners, partly to help with retention, since they will have a recognised 
qualification – usually funded by the state - after they leave, which often is at a 
relatively early age. Many jobs into which military and security officers might go 
(especially in international organisations) now require a master’s degree to progress 
beyond a certain level. In any event modern military and security operations require 
much more than training in traditional martial skills. 
Military and police officers are also increasingly involved in international 
peacekeeping286 (especially cases mandated by the UN), which is especially political 
and complex. The skills and knowledge required at the higher levels require an 
understanding of international relations, the global security system, politics, social 
analysis, ethnography, management, conflict resolution and much else. All UN 
and regional peacekeeping operations require both political and military expertise, 
interaction between civilians and the military and hence an understanding by military 
officers and senior security officials of international, regional and local governance 
issues, at the very least. 
Peace missions may be a special case, but more broadly in modern democracies, 
military leaders need to understand wider issues, especially policy, finances and 
budgets, civil-military relations, international relations and management. These issues 
will dealt with in more detail later. 
It may be argued that the skills listed above are only relevant in times of peace or 
in non-operational contexts. But security forces are usually, perhaps always, deployed 
in response to problems – and problem-solving requires high intellectual capabilities. 
Moreover, war is arguably one of the most complex of human endeavours, and one of 
the most unpredictable. Staff planning and strategy cannot be a substitute for thinking 
oneself out of the ‘fog of war’ (to use Clausewitz’s famous phrase). Flexibility and 
nimbleness of thought are equally as necessary at senior military level as traditional 
qualities of bravery (and ruthlessness), discipline, loyalty and logistical competence.
Education of course does not necessarily translate into military success. The US 
has one of the most educated officer corps in the world – 82.8 per cent of officers had 
at least a bachelor’s degree in 2010287 – but the US military’s record in recent wars 
in not very convincing. What is probably more important is not education itself, but 
the type of education given, which should lead to a critical-thinking capability and an 
understanding of the social and political context in which any conflict is taking place. 
Approaches to security education288 
There are a number of models for the education of senior officers and security 
officials around the world. This research focuses on education and makes a distinction 
education and training. Some professions, such as medicine and engineering, do not 
necessarily recognise this difference, and indeed the dividing line between the two 
is not always clear. It is said that ‘training is for certainty whilst education is for 
uncertainty’.289 In the early 1990s, when sex education was being introduced into 
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South African schools, a senior officer from the old South African Defence Force 
perhaps but it best, when he told me that he didn’t mind his kids undergoing sex 
education but he would most certainly object to sex training!
At higher levels of education, whatever organisational models are used, it is 
generally the case throughout the world that recognised civilian experts, drawn from 
the academy or civil society, are used alongside qualified military personnel to deliver 
certain subjects or topics. This is mainly because the competencies involved require 
a mastery of conceptual and methodological approaches, complementing operational 
competencies. Also, uniformed personnel do not – and probably should not – make 
full-time careers in the academy. 
Higher education for military officers often takes place at staff colleges, but as 
Last et al have pointed out in this journal many if not most of these are not ‘university-
like’ which requires that they offer batchelor’s and master’s-level degrees, backed by 
research and publications.290 Globally, only about 20 per cent of military colleges fit 
into this category, and only seven per cent of police colleges. Police training is usually 
just that, training not education (in countries with a gendarmerie they tend to occupy 
a middle ground between military education and police training). It is unclear why the 
police lag so far behind the military in this regard, when intuitively one would assume 
that because police are more integrated with civilian life they would be better placed 
to pursue higher education.291 
Another option for educating officers in the security services is to offer graduate 
or post-graduate degrees awarded by universities (which may be delivered through 
military colleges or at university campuses).  Existing degrees in management or 
policy or international relations, for example, can be used or adapted to military 
and security service requirements. This option is increasingly common, at least in 
countries where the requisites are available within existing national or local (and 
sometimes private) university curricula. 
Universities have a mandate to issue degrees, which are usually legitimate 
if not always credible. Many national or local universities may have the essential 
administrative and academic capability to award their own degrees appropriate for 
an officer corps, sometimes in cooperation with a military academy. This is the case 
in Sudan and Rwanda. In many other cases, military academies or similar institutions 
issue degrees, as in India and Pakistan, using both civilian and military lecturers 
(Mukerjee 2017). In the dying days of Robert Mugabe’s presidency, Zimbabwe’s 
parliament went further, approving the establishment of a ‘military university’ (to 
be named after the president). But the resources for this were completely lacking 
(personal correspondence with Centre for Defence Studies). 
In Europe and the US, dozens of non-military universities offer degrees in security 
studies, military studies or related issues, many of which are targeted in part at senior 
security practitioners. No doubt the universities have their own institutional and 
financial interests in this market – and in most of the world tertiary institutions are 
increasingly market-oriented.
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There is another important factor that has enabled civilian tertiary institutions to 
deal with security issues. Approaches to security have been broadened since the end of 
the Cold War and military officers have to engage with a wide range of issues related 
to the widening of concepts of security (social, economic, political, environmental). 
While it is not primarily their job, they also have to understand  the discourse around 
human security which underpins the security policies of many states these days (in 
which the referent level and the priority for security is not the state but people).These 
of course are issues traditionally more the provenance of civilian than military experts. 
A somewhat older discipline, that of peace studies (for example as offered at 
Bradford University and the UN University of Peace in Hiroshima) has also gradually 
become more elided with security studies. 
Strategic studies, once defined rather narrowly as ‘the use of force within and 
between states’ (Buzan 1983:3) and somewhat fixated (understandably during the Cold 
War) on nuclear warfare has developed an expanded mandate (including ‘terrorism 
studies’, now a field in its own right with literally hundreds of books having been 
written since 9/11). 
All these disciplines are increasingly interrelated and overlap. This has led if not 
to confusion, at least to diffusion within the academy. It is entirely possible to study 
the same security-related issues for degrees with widely diverging nomenclature 
(ranging from war studies to peace studies).
A internet search will throw up options for masters qualifications such as a 
‘masters in international security studies’ (universities in Italy and the Czech republic), 
‘defence, security and crisis management’ (France) ‘diplomacy and international 
security’ (Lebanon), ‘strategic and arms control studies’ (Russia), ‘military studies’ 
and ‘defence and security management (South Africa) and so on. Further, these 
qualifications fall under a range of different faculties and schools – law, management, 
politics, international relations, economics, social studies to name just a few.  
Some of the degrees are co-accredited by two or more universities and programmes 
are shared. Another option - used in Ethiopia, for example - is to “buy in” (usually 
with donor money) a complete master’s degree, from a university in a ‘donor country’, 
which offers what is regarded as a suitable curriculum. In principle, the idea in many 
countries seems to be to build indigenous academic expertise, so that in time courses 
can be run by a local university issuing its own qualifications. This has happened in 
Indonesia and remains an aspiration in Lebanon (Chuter 2016). 
Add to this the large number of military academies, which usually fall directly 
under ministries of defence or the armed forces, and it clear that the opportunities of 
higher education in fields directly relevant for senior officers and senior police and 
intelligence forces are extremely wide. Usually such academies pitch at colonel or 
brigadier level at an inter-service level and are aimed at educating aspirant generals. 
At a lower level (usually major) many, if most, countries have institutions typically 
called war colleges or command and staff colleges. These tend towards training at the 
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operational level but may also have some strategic foci and ‘are the first place we find 
curricula routinely requiring critical thought, reading, research and problem solving 
beyond tactical military situations’.292
Africa  
South Africa by far leads the way in terms of tertiary-level security education. 
Many of the options discussed above have been implemented for some time: a war 
college, a defence college and a military academy run by the South African National 
Defence Force (SANDF) and in the case of the military academy, accreditation 
and research and teaching support from the University of Stellenbosch, leading to 
a Batchelor of Military Science (BMil). Security related degrees are also available 
at other state-established universities, notably the University of Pretoria (strategic 
studies). 
Elsewhere in Africa, the only countries with anything approaching this academic 
wealth are Kenya and Nigeria.293 The South African Military Academy in Saldanha 
Bay, the Nigerian one in Kaduna and the Kenyan one in Nakuru all offer degrees 
accredited by universities in their respective countries and teach in English with a 
combination of uniformed and civilian lecturers. 
In Africa, as elsewhere in the world, staff colleges and military academies are 
increasingly supplemented by peacekeeping training centres, which, although they do 
not usually offer degrees do include, at least on their flagship programmes, the kind 
of self-directed learning characterised by reading, critical thinking and sometimes 
research. The key institutions in Africa are the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre 
in Harare (which is somewhat moribund), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Centre in Accra, the Peacekeeping Training Centre in Pretoria and the 
International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi. All of these teach in English.
Regional and international co-operation 
On the most senior national officer education courses, at military academies and 
universities, learning places are made available for participants from other countries – 
sometimes only for allies or regional partners or countries perceived to be ‘neutral’ or 
non-threatening, sometimes more widely. In universities, these are often made open to 
any applicants, whatever their institutional or national affiliations; in defence colleges 
or other state-controlled institutions it is usually by invitation only.
Although there is some inter-service co-operation between universities and 
academies in different countries, this is normally on the basis of a functional division 
of labour and specialisation. What is less usual, in fact surprisingly lacking, is 
the construction of a consciously regional approach to converge or harmonise the 
education of senior security practitioners from various countries in a given inter-state 
region or trans-national security regime. 294 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1268
82
Of course, major powers often offer their education and training programmes to 
allies (the US in Latin America, France in its former colonies, NATO in Eastern and 
Central Europe to note the most prominent recent examples) but this is not the same as 
building a regional capacity in which resources are shared and indigenised.  
The most important global security co-operation regime (primarily of course a 
mutual defence arrangement) is NATO, but even here there is little coordination at 
higher education levels, except on bilateral bases. At least one proposal has been made 
to set up a NATO combined approach to professional military education, involving 
military academies in the various NATO member states and universities, with the aim 
of fostering ‘an elite of officer-scholars’ (Wilton Park 2013:1). This would entail the 
systematic linking of education, training and research, but it would need to take into 
account ‘national cultural, political and ethical barriers’ and would include distance 
education and massively open online courses (MOOC). This proposal seems to be 
aspirational and will in any case take some time to implement even if the modalities 
can be agreed, not least because NATO countries have cut expenditure on military 
education by 30 per cent in the five years following the economic crisis of 2008.295
The case of the Southern African Defence and Security Management Network 
(SADSEM)296
In the context of this background, this paper now turns to the case study of the 
Southern African Defence and Security Management Network, a security educational 
initiative that eventually linked all the then 15 countries of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), mainly through national universities. This appears 
to a fairly unique case although it has not attracted much, if any, academic attention 
in that it worked mostly behind the scenes given the sensitivities of Southern African 
governments around security issues, particularly if foreign donors are involved. 
SADSEM was based on universities but worked closely with national security 
structures, focused on indigenous knowledge, developed common regional curricula, 
operated in three former colonial languages, and was linked to the SADC regional 
security co-operation and integration project. It did not reach its full potential. In 
the words of Andre du Pisani ‘SADSEM was a visionary and all-too-rare epistemic 
network that did not quite flower into an epistemic community’.297
International influences
In 1993, when the SADSEM project had its genesis, South Africa - indeed 
the whole Southern African region – was on the cusp of profound change. This 
affected defence policy and the armed forces as much as anything else.  The almost 
simultaneous end of apartheid and the end of the Cold War necessitated and resulted in 
a security sector transformation or reform (SSR) process, a reconfiguration of military 
and security education, civil control of the military and a strengthening of regional 
security collaboration. It also required a that a new approach – a new paradigm – was 
developed to replace the militaristic ‘total strategy’ of the apartheid regime and to lay 
the basis for collaborative regional security. This was found in the ‘widened security’ 
of Barry Buzan and in the human security of the UN Development Programme.298
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Although it was home grown, the South African transformation experience was 
affected by international influences – ‘widened security’ and human security in 
particular.  Somewhat later this was supplemented by the raft of issues which the 
UK in particular promoted as Security Sector Reform (SSR), amounting in effect to 
‘good governance’ for the security sector. The SSR concept was promoted vigorously 
through educational, policy and research agendas, initially in Eastern and Central 
Europe and later in Africa. SSR had political objectives and was strongly underpinned 
by ideological assumptions, but at the time it was mostly accepted not only as a 
normative agenda, but also as a universal and rational one. 
There was a high level of co-operation between the European post-Cold War and 
Southern African post-apartheid initiatives. Although there were major differences 
in approach, ideology and ways of working, the fact that most of Southern Africa 
inherited, for better or worse, British-style institutions and approaches to the 
management of security made exchanges of views with UK scholars and practitioners 
fairly easy. (The ministries of defence in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa are 
modelled on those of the UK). There were extensive intellectual exchanges between 
Southern African and UK scholars in the early 1990s, and these continue. Furthermore, 
the South African military education system was increasingly evolving along the lines 
of that in the UK (albeit with a different content). A British advisory team still remains 
at South Africa’s peacekeeping training centre. 
From the outset, SADSEM was primarily funded by the Danish government, and 
this also provided for intellectual exchanges between Danish and Southern African 
scholars and practitioners. SADSEM scholars and practitioners paid a number of visits 
to the UK and Denmark to study security management institutions there and security 
education approaches. SADSEM also made early contact with scholars working on 
security elsewhere in Africa, which became an important influence. 
Above all, SADSEM sought to develop an indigenous capacity for security 
scholarship and practice, first in South Africa, then in the Southern African region 
and to some extent elsewhere in the continent. I will trace how this evolved (usually 
organically), before turning to a consideration of SADSEM’s programmes, projects 
and achievements and then considering its limitations and limited legacies.
Origins and institutional architecture
SADSEM had its origins in the South African transformation process.  Specifically 
a need was identified to train and educate a cadre of both civilians and military officers 
to staff a new ministry of defence and to ensure civil control and oversight of the 
military.
An ANC-aligned group exploring post-apartheid security policy, the Military 
Research Group, raised funds from the Danish government for this purpose and 
training programme was set up at a new public management school, the School 
of Public and Development Management, modelled as a miniature version of the 
Kennedy School at Harvard.
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In practice this programme became an important locus for developing a new 
ethos for the new national defence force and oiled the cogs of integration between 
seven disparate armed formations that came to constitute the South African National 
Defence force (SANDF).
The programme initially focused on civil-military-relations but also promoted 
new conceptual approaches to security and explored regional security options, 
carrying out amongst other things a comparative international survey of regional 
security arrangements such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, ASEAN, ECOWAS and the Gulf Co-operation Council.   
It was realised that civil control of the military was also a challenge in other 
Southern African countries that were transitioning from war to peace, from one party 
to multiparty systems or from nominally command economies to market driven ones. 
Further, it was thought that the conceptual frameworks developed by the programme 
could contribute to the evolution of co-operative security in the region.
From the outset, the organisers were determined that work in Southern Africa 
should be carried out on the basis of institutional partnerships between universities, 
and that this needed to be done incrementally and be linked to capacity building. The 
reality was that as result of state centric securitisation in the region, outside of South 
Africa and Zimbabwe and possibly Namibia, academics and civil society had been 
almost completely excluded from dealing with security issues … and many security 
practitioners had an anti-intellectual bent. 
It was thus necessary to build capacity with the academy by re-tooling established 
academics to enable them to engage with security issues, as well as building a new 
generation of security scholars and empowering security officers to deal with academic 
issues. This is dealt with later. 
To ensure effective communication with governments and the relevance of the 
programme, an advisory structure was set up, consisting of representatives of all 
the SADC governments, military officers, national security advisors, ministers, 
secretaries for defence and the like. It would be unfair to say that SADSM did not 
take this structure seriously, after all it was essential to is functions, but in reality it 
offered little in terms of ideas but much in bureaucracy. 
How was the network set up? Not easily. Snowballing helped. Identification of 
partners was a complex process, involving individuals and institutions. Individuals 
were usually identified as those who had sufficient academic and political credibility 
and had engaged, however peripherally, with security issues. But they had to have to 
have the ability to take their institutions with them. These transformative individuals 
came from various academic traditions: political studies, governance, public 
administration, history. The historians proved to be most insightful. (The author is 
convinced that history and geopolitics is the key to understanding security rather 
than the disciplines of political studies and international relations, but that is another 
matter.) 
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Over the years this interaction between individual academics, their institutions 
and the national security services, resulted in the network.299 A kind of ‘variable 
geometry’ developed, in that there was no uniformity between the partners, some of 
which were university departments, some semi-NGOs300, some programmes, going 
by different names ranging from strategic studies, through peace studies to defence 
studies. The partners met at quarterly steering committee meetings hosted by partners 
in-country on a rotational basis and chaired by the hosting partner. This ensured 
common ownership and worked well – all decisions were taken by consensus after 
the usual lobbying and not once was a vote required. Funds were allocated on an 
equitable basis and all partners presented narrative and audited financial reports to the 
Steering Committee. The whole structure and its programmes were supported by a 
small permanent secretariat at the Centre for Defence Studies at the University of the 
Witwatersrand, which also acted as the nodal point for interaction with donors and the 
receipt and distribution of funds.   
SADSEM was determined that the network would not be one of individuals but 
of institutions. Further, it had to be linked to governments, regional structures such as 
SADC and the African Union. As time went on SADSEM assisted in the construction 
of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), which was intended to be a ‘network 
of networks’ in that similar structures to SADSEM would be set up through Africa, or 
at least in West and East Africa, and the Horn.  This is another story since it became 
very difficult to realise, but it was part of ‘master plan’ (if one can swallow such a 
concept) between the SADSEM leaders and those from West, East and the Horn. 
Relations with the African Union were mainly ad-hoc and pursued through policy 
conferences, workshops and personal consultancies. 
Training
One of the key activities of SADSEM was what might be considered as ‘in-service’ 
training. Short executive courses, usually of five day’s duration, were delivered in-
country, usually entirely for nationals from the country concerned, which aided in free 
exchanges. Lecturers, however, were drawn from throughout the SADSEM network 
since there was seldom capacity in any given country to cover all the topics required.
These executive programmes were of various types (which evolved over time and 
according to demand): Defence and Security Management, Managing Multi-National 
Peace Missions, Parliamentary Oversight of Defence (for parliamentarians as well as 
military and police officers), Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Governance 
(which was essentially about Security Sector Reform but the term ‘reform’ was 
disliked by some countries who associated it with a Western agenda).
Whatever the type of course, attendees were always a mix of uniformed personnel 
(armed forces, police and prisons), government officials (including intelligence officers 
and parliamentarians), academics and civil society leaders. This was a deliberate effort 
to break down the ‘silos’ of security and develop a national discourse on security. In 
evaluations, participants usually remarked that the composition of the participants 
was just as important as the content, as in many countries such interactions had never 
occurred. 
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Curricula were developed by the network as a whole at regular workshops with 
inputs from academics and practitioners alike. Programmes were fairly standardised 
but with provison made for national issues and some flexibility: core modules 
were mixed with optional modules chosen by the organisers according to national 
requirements. 
Of course, quite extensive preparation was required, usually done by the host 
partner using a set of ‘Standard Operating Procedures’ developed by the network 
and involving the identification of participants, lining up the facilitators, making 
arrangements for funding and payments (keeping per diems to an absolute minimum!), 
finding a university, government or private venue etc. Funding for courses was set at a 
standard rate as long as 30 participants were enrolled but quite often these funds were 
supplemented (often in kind) by relevant government departments, and attendance at 
some courses reached over 70.
Decisions as to which courses would be run, where and when were taken by the 
Steering Committee by consensus. As time went on, a tendency developed to run 
programmes outside of the national capitals, to reach provincial officials, to ‘take 
people away from their offices’ and also to save costs. 
Programmes were held in all 15 SADC countries but not evenly so: more courses 
were held in Zimbabwe, the DRC and Namibia for example and only a few in the 
Indian Ocean Islands (in part this was because of the size of the constituencies). Over 
the duration of the project over 100 executive courses were delivered with around 
4 000 people trained, approximately half of whom were uniformed, a quarter from 
government a quarter from civil society. 
Participants on the Executive Courses were not assessed and only certificates 
of attendance were issued. However, once a year, always in Johannesburg for cost 
reasons, a month-long certificate programme was held on one of the five ‘types’ 
(Peace Missions, Security Sector Governance etc). These were more intensive courses 
and usually involved simulation exercises, field visits, training in research, the use of 
libraries and the internet and so on. Students were assessed through exams, essays and 
group work.301 Lectures were almost always in English but Portuguese and French 
interpretation was provided as well some material in those languages. International 
lecturers from SADSEM partners abroad were also used. The certificate was a flagship 
programme (and a rather expensive exercise given that only 50 students – usually 
from all of the SADC member states – could be accommodated).
There is a well-known debate in educational circles about the value of short 
courses.  Generally the academic jury finds that such programmes add little value. 
Whilst they might contribute to individual advancement, they make little contribution 
to organisational progression. But it may be that in certain contexts, for example in 
countries emerging from repression or conflict, a certain ‘switching on the light’ or 
even epiphany might happen on such courses, particularly if they act not so much 
as information-giving exercises as information-sharing and confidence and trust-
building ones. 
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This is reflected in the evaluations of the SADSEM executive courses, and 
especially the month-long certificate courses. With regard to the latter 96 per cent 
of participants felt that the programme had benefited them as an individual, 99 per 
cent thought that it ‘had enhanced my understanding and knowledge of defence and 
security management’, but most importantly 87 per cent agreed that the course had 
‘helped improve the performance of my organisation’ 
In any case, by 2009 SADSEM had moved on from short-course delivery (although 
some of these continued) towards developing institutionalised post-graduate degree 
programmes in security. These will now be examined. 
Education 
From its inception, SADSEM had a vision of developing post-graduate degrees 
in security to be delivered across Southern Africa to contribute to the stabilisation of 
civil-military relations and the evolution of collaborative or even common security, on 
the basis of shared norms and epistemes. 
The dream was to set up a common ‘masters degree in security’ that would be 
offered at several Southern African universities. In the flush of post-cold war regional 
integration, similar projects had been launched in Southern Africa in the fields of 
policy and political economy, for example (SAPES for example). All had failed, 
despite lavish donor support. The reasons for failure were manifold, but included 
the enormous costs of delivering conjoint programmes between universities, national 
sensibilities, personal ambitions, and the intractable bureaucratic problems in 
harmonising the accreditation criteria of disparate national universities. 
So SADSEM settled on a long-term project to morph the short courses into a 
variety of security-related degrees at the universities which potentially had the 
capacity to deliver such programmes. This would constitute a cognate universe of 
post-graduate qualifications but not a centralised one. First off the blocks was the 
University of Zimbabwe, that had developed a post-graduate diploma and masters 
(and PhD) in war studies, modelled during the post-independence honeymoon with 
the UK on the programmes at King’s College, University of London. This predated 
SADSEM and was sustainable, producing compelling research and credible graduates. 
In South Africa, there were (and still are) well-established, intellectually sound, 
degrees accredited by Stellenbosch University, in part through the Military Academy 
at Saldanha, as well as very sound offerings at the University of Pretoria. SADSEM 
should have made more to build on these, but there was some historic enmity between 
many of the other Southern African Universities and the Afrikaans universities, 
who were seen as promoters of South Africa’s destabilisation campaign against 
neighbouring countries. Despite well-intentioned efforts on both sides, this crack took 
a long time to seal.
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The first real effort to amalgamate the intellectual products of the SADSEM 
short programmes into post-graduate degrees took place at the then Graduate School 
of Public and Development Management (now the School of Governance) at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. This was in part achieved by merging existing 
degrees in governance with the security ‘modules’ developed by SADSEM. After all, 
it was argued, in so far as possible defence and security should be governed in the 
same way as any other department of state – although the exceptions (secrecy and 
command-and-control for example) are important. 
Thereafter, the Universities of Namibia, Mzuzu, Botswana, and Kinshasa302 started 
to proffer post-graduate degrees in security studies (with different nomenclatures) 
based in large part on the curricula developed by SADSEM. No effort was made to 
harmonise curricula, although there were workshops (funded by the UK) to discuss 
common problems and also address issues of teaching and learning methodology, 
particularly in relation to hierarchical organisations. 
The presumption is that these post-graduate initiatives will be sustainable, in 
large part because of the argument offered at the beginning of this article, that it is 
necessary for any modern officer corps (and their civilian equivalents) to be qualified 
and enabled to cope with twenty-first century security challenges. More prosaically, 
degrees are funded not usually by fickle donors, but by motivated students themselves 
(or by their employees, although if they fail they often have to pay back).
Research
In part to indigenise its curriculum and develop local cases studies, as well as 
to contribute to policy development (and help to advance the careers of SADSEM 
academics in line with the ‘publish or perish’ ethos of the academy) SADSEM initiated 
a international research projects. These took the form of multi-country consultations 
to develop agendas and research questions, to carry out field research and case studies 
and to calibrate the results. Several multi-country seminars and conferences on relevant 
issues were also arranged, as well as bi-lateral exchanges between countries such 
as Nigeria, Ghana and Denmark. Topics were wide-ranging, often driven by policy 
challenges – terrorism, Indian Ocean security, conflict management for example. But 
some were broader and longer term, for example on civil-military relations in Africa, 
or security and development in the continent. In addition, academics and (quite often 
practitioners) attached to SADSEM carried out their own individual research. The 
resulting output of these activities was several books, book chapters, conferences 
papers and the like – well over 200 academic products (for an almost complete list, at 
least until 2008, see CMI).303
Scholarships and internships 
As part of the process of ‘re-tooling’ academics to deal with security issues, the 
academic capacities of uniformed and civilian senior officials in government, and to 
produce a ‘new generation’ of security experts in the region, SADSEM administered 
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– through its Steering Committee – a limited scholarship programme and was also 
able to access international scholarships. Efforts were made in particular to enrol very 
senior officials in study programmes (these were not usually successful as candidates 
tended to be recalled by their governments) but through-put for younger scholars 
was more successful. Potential students were also sent on short-course diploma or 
certificate programmes. In all cases, scholarships were not tenable overseas (in part 
due to costs but also for political reasons) but were redeemable at Southern African 
institutions. 
While the results were at best mixed (and the resources available very limited), 
nevertheless something of a ‘new generation’ of researchers evolved, and many 
recipients of such scholarships went on to lecture on SADSEM programmes.
Policy development 
Foreign donors are understandably keen to argue that their interventions lead 
to policy change, but this is almost impossible to prove. Even a well-thought-out 
policy document with apparent buy-in by policy actors will not necessarily lead to any 
behavioural change. SADSEM did play a fairly prominent role in crafting national and 
multi-governmental policies on security in Southern Africa – national white papers 
on defence, policing, intelligence, border protection and the like. It also contributed 
to SADC wide policies on defence and security-cooperation, maritime security, 
parliamentary co-operation, conflict resolution and so on, always in co-operation with 
governments and sometimes with other organisations. Individual members also played 
quite important roles in some of the conflict resolution issues (Lesotho, Madagascar, 
DRC). But it would impossible to claim that these interventions led to either positive 
or negative outcomes. At best, it can be conjectured that the network’s insistence on 
building sound civil-military relations and in bringing together civilians and military 
personnel in confidence-building exercises may have dampened enthusiasm for 
military coups in South Africa (successful ones of which have been absent in Southern 
Africa except in the pathological case of Lesotho and the ‘coup-that-was-not-a-coup’ 
in Harare in 2017). 
Relations with SADC’s formal inter-governmental structures were also always 
rather fraught. Of all the sub-regional security co-operation organisations in Africa 
SADC is perhaps the most averse to non-state (or non-member state) interventions. 
Perhaps this is because the memory of colonialism is so recent and that sovereignty 
in so many countries was very hard-earned as a result of the violent struggles against 
settler colonialism. More than once it was put to me by senior officers from Angola or 
Zimbabwe that the imperialists aimed to win back through politics what they had lost 
on the battlefield. On the whole SADC refused to accept donor funding for security 
programmes or for its security structure, the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. 
This made it very difficult for SADSEM to officially partner with SADC on the basis 
of joint programmes.
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This problem was perhaps best (although somewhat obliquely) diagnosed in 
the major evaluation of SADSEM carried out by the Norwegian-based Christian 
Michelsen Institute (CMI) in 2009:
•  A first observation is that the level of donor-funding allocated to or through 
SADC and the Organ directorate in Gaborone remains very small. It is 
mainly provided by  
• Germany which provides funding for technical advisors in the Secretariat ...
• The reasons for the small amount of funding going through SADC has 
mainly to do with SADC’s refusal to accept such funding in this area 
[security] as well as limited ability to absorb such support ...
• A second observation is that donors generally have much more funding 
available for SADC and intergovernmental organisations, but they are 
currently unable to disperse it. 
• A third observation is that it may be more difficult to ensure aid effectiveness 
in external funding to the peace and security sector compared to other 
thematic areas.304
Although diplomatically coded, the picture is clear and this inevitably placed a 
limit on SADSEM (as a largely donor-funded body) from fully evolving its relationship 
with SADC, despite the existence of formal memoranda of understanding and the like. 
A closer relationship was developed between SADSEM and the SADC Parliamentary 
Forum, but the latter was a toothless body which the SADC heads of state ignored.
Assessment 
As can been seen from this account, SADSEM was quite a unique experiment in 
constructing a security training, educational and research regime build on universities 
but working with governments and security establishments. It was overtly normative 
but sought always to develop indigenous capacities and to take account of local 
conditions and possibilities. 
In the end it did not achieve full maturity (in part for reasons expounded in 
the section above and when (rather generous) donor funding started to evaporature 
after the global financial crisis of 2008, the network was much reduced. Large parts 
of it survived, however, mainly because it had been built through institutions not 
individuals, and had achieved sustainability through academic programmes. In at least 
five of original core ten member countries, institutions and programmes remained 
active at the time of writing and the network still carried out a limited number of 
activities across the whole region (including the research and production of an Annual 
Southern African Security Review linked to a regional conference).
Du Pisani has argued that high levels of trust were built in a most difficult field 
and that SADSEM succeeded ‘to the degree that it was able to marshal meaningful 
political, normative, intellectual and institutional capacities’. It further demonstrated 
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something that some might disagree with, ‘that the best form of scholarship is 
networked and based on collaborative works’.305
There was a window of opportunity in South Africa that allowed this – transitions 
from war to peace, from authoritarianism to democracy and from command to market 
economies, as well as an existing security complex based on a hegemonic power 
coming to peace with itself– an environment that may be difficult to find again.   
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